Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals by Speir, Ian S. & Mohebbi, Nima H.
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 
Volume 16 Issue 2 Article 5 
2015 
Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Ian S. Speir 
Nima H. Mohebbi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ian S. Speir and Nima H. Mohebbi, Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 281 (2015). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/appellatepracticeprocess/vol16/iss2/5 
This document is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process by an authorized administrator of 





      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 72 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
SPEIRMOHEBBIRESEND2 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/2016 5:38 PM 
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 2015) 
PRESERVATION RULES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
Ian S. Speir and Nima H. Mohebbi* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation is a long journey, and legal arguments are 
perishable goods. Before beginning the journey, attorneys must 
consider not only which arguments to take with them, but also 
how to preserve those arguments for both trial and appeal. 
Appellate courts, particularly the federal courts of appeals, have 
developed a sophisticated, often complex, and sometimes 
conflicting set of preservation rules. These are part of the 
“winnowing process” of litigation, the “machinery by which 
courts narrow what remains to be decided.”1
Preservation rules are a key component of every advocate’s 
toolkit. Trial counsel must know them. Appellate attorneys must 
use them. But the rules can also be a trap for the unwary. 
Sometimes, the argument that might have won on appeal wasn’t 
timely or adequately raised at trial, and it doesn’t survive the 
journey.
This article surveys preservation rules in the federal courts 
of appeals, focusing in particular on the Tenth Circuit, which has 
addressed in detail some of the more peculiar iterations of 
preservation principles. We begin by providing some brief 
background on preservation, then delve into the related doctrines 
of waiver, forfeiture, and plain error. We next explore legal 
contexts in which these doctrines either do not apply or have 
*Both authors are former Tenth Circuit law clerks. Ian Speir is a litigation associate with 
Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and holds a J.D. from the 
Georgetown University Law Center. Nima Mohebbi is a litigation associate with Latham & 
Watkins LLP in Los Angeles, and holds a J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone. 
 1. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 n.6 (2008) (internal quotation 
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unique application, such as subject-matter jurisdiction, sovereign 
immunity, and objections to evidence. Finally, we examine 
preservation rules in the context of appellate briefing. 
This survey is designed to assist both trial and appellate 
counsel as they navigate the federal courts’ preservation rules. 
As important as the rules are, it’s critical to remember the 
reasons behind them. Requiring parties to timely and adequately 
raise the arguments they want the court to address vindicates 
both structural and prudential values and ensures basic fairness 
to all parties. Balanced against these objectives is the court’s 
“insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.”2 Each 
of these considerations is in play when preservation is at issue. 
Appellate counsel therefore has a unique opportunity: to argue 
not only for application of a particular preservation rule, but to 
explain to the court why, in a particular case, that rule serves the 
interests it is designed to serve. 
II. PRESERVATION BASICS
Any discussion of preservation rules must begin with the 
nature of our adversarial system. Courts depend on the parties, 
as self-interested litigants, to raise the issues they want the court 
to rule on. Courts typically do not decide, or even discuss, issues 
that the parties have not raised. As the Supreme Court recently 
put it, “[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that . . . courts 
do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, 
but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and 
argued by the parties before them.”3
The first place in which parties must raise their arguments 
is the district court. As a general rule, an argument not first 
presented to the district court is not a proper basis for appeal.4
As the Tenth Circuit has explained, 
 2. United States v. Frost, 684 F.3d 963, 971–72 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 
 3.  NASA v. Nelson, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 n.10 (2011) (quoting Carducci 
v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 749 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Ours is 
an adversarial system of justice. The presumption, therefore, is to hold the parties 
responsible for raising their own defenses.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of 
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[i]n order to preserve the integrity of the appellate structure, 
we should not be considered a “second-shot” forum, a 
forum where secondary, back-up theories may be mounted 
for the first time. . . . Parties must be encouraged to “give it 
everything they’ve got” at the trial level.5
To properly preserve an issue, a party must do more than simply 
raise it. She must both “aler[t] the district court to the issue and 
see[k] a ruling.”6 Arguments asserted but never pursued are not 
a basis for appeal.7 Neither are “vague and ambiguous” 
arguments or “fleeting contention[s]” made in the district court.8
Sometimes, a party advances one argument to the district 
court and a different but related argument on appeal. Typically, 
this won’t do. For example, in Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. 
LMC Holding Co., the Tenth Circuit found a “palpable 
distinction” between a challenge to the district court’s analysis
of a rule and a challenge to whether the rule applies at all.9
There’s an important caveat to all of these principles, one 
that’s often overlooked. New arguments in support of the 
decision below—that is, in support of affirming the district 
court—are treated differently than novel appellate arguments for 
reversal. The court of appeals traditionally “may affirm on any 
basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on 
arguments not reached by the district court or even presented . . . 
on appeal.”10 This in turn means that an appellee is generally 
free to raise any argument in support of affirmance, so long as 
there’s some basis in the record for it and the appellant has had a 
fair chance to address it.11 By contrast, a party seeking reversal 
 5. Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation 
omitted). 
 6. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1142 
(10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d 
1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 7. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Total, S.A., 538 F.3d 1336, 1351 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 8. U.S. Aviation, 582 F.3d at 1142.
 9. 497 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 10. See, e.g., Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 11. Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1200 (10th Cir. 2011). We say 
“generally” because there are exceptions even to this rule. For example, in the Tenth 
Circuit, the argument that the opposing party is estopped from litigating a particular issue 
must be timely raised. If an appellee fails to timely raise an estoppel defense, the defense is 
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of the district court’s decision based on a newly minted theory 
faces an uphill climb, one shaped by the principles of waiver, 
forfeiture, and plain error. We turn to those principles now. 
III. WAIVER, FORFEITURE, AND THE PLAIN-ERROR STANDARD
Common parlance and even some judicial decisions often 
fail to distinguish between arguments that are waived and 
arguments that are forfeited. The two concepts are distinct, and 
the differences can be, and often are, dispositive. 
Waiver requires some intentional act by a party.12 It occurs 
when a party has “intentionally relinquished or abandoned” an 
argument either in the district court or on appeal.13 For example, 
under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not induce action 
by the district court and later seek reversal on the same ground.14
Likewise, a party may not appeal based on an argument she has 
expressly abandoned.15 In either situation, a waiver has 
occurred, and the party “is not entitled to appellate relief.”16
Forfeiture is different. It happens not by a deliberate act, 
but by neglecting to present an argument to the district court.17
Unlike a waived argument, a forfeited argument may be grounds 
for reversal on appeal, but only if affirming the district court 
would result in plain error.18 Plain error generally requires the 
proponent of the new argument to show “(1) error, (2) that is 
plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1030 
(10th Cir. 2003).
 12.  See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 13.  Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127.
 14.  See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006); Eateries, Inc. 
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 15.  See United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2007).
 16.  Teague, 443 F.3d at 1314.
 17.  See Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128.
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judicial proceedings.”19 If each of these elements is satisfied, the 
court “may exercise discretion to correct the error.”20
A. The Elements of Plain Error 
Plain error has the unique distinction of being both a 
standard of review and a multi-pronged test, and the court will 
grant relief only if each prong of the test is satisfied. Still, 
always bear in mind the driving force behind the test: preserving 
the court’s discretion to correct “clear legal error that implicates 
a miscarriage of justice.”21 As the Seventh Circuit has aptly put 
it, relief is appropriate when a district court’s error “shakes 
one’s faith in the judicial process.”22
1. Error 
The first prong of the test goes to the merits of the forfeited 
argument. It requires the appellant to explain why the district 
court erred, or why error would otherwise result if the district 
court’s ruling is affirmed. Sometimes, the court tackles this 
element head-on, concludes there was no error, and declines to 
address the remaining prongs of the test.23 In this situation, the 
argument gets its day in court as if it were not forfeited. 
2. Plain 
The second prong of the test examines whether the alleged 
error is plain. To be plain, the error must be “clear or obvious 
under current law.”24 “Clear or obvious” means that there is 
 19. Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (referring to “plain” 
error that affects both “substantial rights” and the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings”). 
 20. United States ex rel. Bahrani v. ConAgra, Inc., 624 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 
2010) (quoting Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 F.3d 1242, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2010)). The 
standard as articulated by the Tenth Circuit is largely similar to the plain-error standards 
employed by other circuits. See, e.g., Lopez v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 690 F.3d 869, 877 (8th 
Cir. 2012); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1193 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 21. Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1199.
 22. United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1539 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 23. See Eller v. Trans Union, LLC, 739 F.3d 467, 480 (10th Cir. 2013); see also United
States v. Waller, 689 F.3d 947, 960 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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controlling precedent on point, either from the Supreme Court, 
the relevant federal circuit, or (if the issue is one of state law) 
the relevant state courts.25 In the absence of binding precedent, 
the clear weight of authority in other federal circuits might make 
an error plain.26 By contrast, a circuit split will almost always 
foreclose a finding of plain error.27
The error must be clear or obvious “under current law.”28
Sometimes, a district court’s decision may be correct when 
rendered but erroneous at the time of appeal due to an 
intervening change in the law (such as new, binding precedent 
from the Supreme Court). Prior to 2013, there was a circuit split 
on how to handle this situation. The rule in the Tenth Circuit 
was to assess the error “at the time of appeal.”29 The Supreme 
Court recently affirmed this approach in Henderson v. United 
States, drawing on the basic principle that “an appellate court 
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.”30
3. Affects Substantial Rights. 
To satisfy the third prong of plain-error review, the 
appellant must show that the error affected her “substantial 
 25. See United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012) (“In 
general, for an error to be contrary to well-settled law, either the Supreme Court or this 
court must have addressed the issue.” (citation omitted)); Therrien v. Target Corp., 617 
F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir. 2010) (looking to Oklahoma caselaw to determine that error 
was not plain under Oklahoma law); Hornick v. Boyce, 280 Fed. App’x 770, 775–76 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (noting that “this is an unsettled question under Colorado law, and the 
[appellants] have therefore failed to show any plain error”). 
 26. See United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Although 
neither the Supreme Court nor this court has decided the issue, given the weight of 
authority from other circuits, we conclude that the error was sufficiently clear and obvious 
to be plain error . . . .”). 
 27. See Teague, 443 F.3d at 1319 (“If neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit 
has ruled on the subject, we cannot find plain error if the authority in other circuits is 
split.”); United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 480 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that error was 
not plain where “[o]ur court has never addressed the convergence argument, and the other 
circuits are split on the issue”); cf. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1248, 1249 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (noting that a circuit split is “strong evidence that an error is not plain,” but is 
ultimately “not dispositive”). 
 28. Bader, 678 F.3d at 868. 
 29. United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 30. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1129 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of City of 
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rights.”31 This generally requires a showing of prejudice—“a 
reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”32 Put otherwise, 
the appellant must convince the court of appeals that the error 
was not harmless.33 “[A]n error affecting a substantial right of a 
party is an error which had a ‘substantial influence’ on the 
outcome or [which] leaves one in ‘grave doubt’ as to whether it 
had such effect.”34
This showing is easy when a district court’s plainly 
erroneous ruling was dispositive of the case or of an issue.35 In 
that situation, the error was clearly prejudicial. However, when 
error is predicated on a district court’s incorrect evidentiary 
ruling or erroneous jury instruction, a showing of prejudice is 
much more difficult. The court of appeals must assess the error 
in light of the entire record36 and must often make counterfactual 
predictions about how a factfinder would have decided the case 
in the absence of the error.37
 31.  Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128.
 32. Cordery, 656 F.3d at 1108 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 
727, 733 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 33.  By statute and rule, appellate courts are required to ignore “harmless error,” that is, 
error that does “not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 
(Westlaw 2015); FED. R. CIV. P. 61 (Westlaw 2015); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (Westlaw 
2015); see also United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1158 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 52(a) 
harmless error analysis and the third or ‘substantial rights’ prong of Rule 52(b) plain error 
analysis ‘normally require[] the same kind of inquiry.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734)). 
 34. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United 
States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc)) (alteration in original); 
see also Perkins v. Silver Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d 1141, 1151 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (indicating that under substantial-rights prong, proponent must show that error 
“affected the outcome of the proceedings”).
 35. See Flud v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 528 Fed. App’x 796, 
799 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court dismissed Flud’s claim solely because he failed 
to comply with § 19, which the Oklahoma Supreme Court has since ruled is void and 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the district court plainly erred in basing its dismissal on 
Flud’s failure to comply with § 19.” (citation omitted)). 
 36. United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 842 n.21 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In conducting 
this analysis, we review the record as a whole.”); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d 
1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1986) (“In determining whether plain error applies in this case, we 
must view the instruction error in the context of the entire record.”).
 37. See Ryan Dev. Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 711 F.3d 1165, 1172 
(10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 936 (10th Cir. 2013); see also 
United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (calling this a “mentally taxing 
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Although most kinds of error are amenable to harmless-
error analysis under the third prong of plain-error review, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here may be a special 
category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of 
their effect on the outcome.”38 These so-called “structural 
errors” are constitutional defects that “affect[] the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply . . . the trial 
process itself.”39 Examples include the total denial of counsel, a 
biased trial judge, or racial discrimination in jury selection.40
Like all arguments, a structural-error argument must first be 
presented to the district court and, if unpreserved, is subject to 
plain-error review. Yet because an analysis of its prejudicial 
effect is impossible, it is likely that structural error automatically 
satisfies the substantial-rights prong.41
4. Discretion. 
If the first three prongs of the plain-error test are met, the 
court then asks whether the error “seriously affects the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”42 If so, 
the court “may exercise discretion to correct the error.”43 This 
final prong of the test is purely discretionary, and it’s impossible 
to say in the abstract when it will apply. Courts typically 
exercise their discretion “when an error is ‘particularly 
egregious’ and the failure to remand for correction would 
 38. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735.
 39. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 310 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[G]enerally speaking structural errors must, 
at a minimum, be constitutional errors.”). 
 40.  See Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (citing cases). 
 41.  The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have consistently reserved this question, see
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 (2009); Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1158, but other 
circuits have so held, see United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. David, 83 F.3d 
638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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produce a ‘miscarriage of justice.’”44 This standard is 
“formidable.”45
At times, the Tenth Circuit has hinted at factors that help 
guide its discretion to consider new arguments. The court is 
more likely to consider a new argument if it presents a “strictly 
legal question the proper resolution of which is beyond doubt,”46
or in “instances where public interest is implicated, . . . or where 
manifest injustice would result.”47 In exercising its discretion, 
the court is “mindful of the policies behind the general rule” of 
preservation.48 Thus, whether the court will entertain an 
unpreserved argument depends on, among other things, the 
adequacy of the factual record; prejudice or unfair surprise to the 
parties; whether the issue is antecedent to or dispositive of 
another issue before the court; the age and complexity of the 
case; the interests at stake, including the extent of liability faced 
by one or more of the parties; and whether resolving the newly 
raised issue allows the court to avoid a more difficult issue, such 
as an unsettled constitutional question.49 Other circuits have 
articulated similar considerations.50
 44. United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 820 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Gonzalez-Huerta); see also Herrera v. City of Albuquerque, 589 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (similarly equating the fourth prong with a “miscarriage of justice”). 
 45. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 820. 
 46. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992); Petrini v. Howard, 
918 F.2d 1482, 1483 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 47. Rademacher v. Colo. Ass’n of Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefit Plan, 11 F.3d 
1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (“Certainly there are 
circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed 
on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt, . . . or where ‘injustice 
might otherwise result.’” (citation omitted)). 
 48. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 49. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 1996); Hicks, 928 F.2d at 
970–71. 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Gewin, 759 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Hayward v. 
Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 615 (6th Cir. 2014); N.J. Carpenters & Trustees v. 
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B. The Origins of Plain Error and Hints 
of a Criminal-Civil Distinction 
Preservation rules are probably as old as the judicial 
system,51 though an exploration of their provenance is beyond 
the scope of this article. For now, suffice it to note that the Tenth 
Circuit and other appellate courts have long recognized the 
ability, in both civil and criminal cases, to notice and correct a 
“plain error” not presented to the court below.52
Today, plain-error jurisprudence is both rules-based and 
judge-made. In criminal cases, it’s governed by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 52(b), which provides that “[a] plain error 
that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it 
was not brought to the court’s attention.”53 Although there is no 
comparable provision in the rules governing civil cases (except 
with respect to erroneous jury instructions54 and rulings on 
evidence,55 both discussed below), the appellate courts “have 
recognized the possibility of plain error in other 
circumstances,”56 and most courts apply the same plain-error 
test in both criminal and civil appeals.57
Despite this seeming congruence, the caselaw suggests that 
plain error has less stringent application in criminal cases. The 
Supreme Court, for example, has noted that an appellate court 
should correct unpreserved errors “especially in criminal 
 51. See, e.g., Kerr v. Watts, 19 U.S. 550, 561 (1821) (“There can be no doubt that this 
question passed sub silentio in the Court below, but it does not appear from any thing on 
the record, that the point was waived . . . .”).
 52. See Williams v. United States, 158 F. 30, 36 (8th Cir. 1907); Nat’l Bank of 
Commerce v. First Nat’l Bank, 61 F. 809, 811–12 (8th Cir. 1894). Decisions of the Eighth 
Circuit made prior to its division into the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in 1929 may be 
binding in the Tenth Circuit. See Boynton v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 57 F.2d 
772, 781 (10th Cir. 1932); but see Estate of McMorris v. Comm’r, 243 F.3d 1254, 1258 
(10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have never held that the decisions of our predecessor circuit are 
controlling in this court.”). 
 53. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (Westlaw 2015). 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (Westlaw 2015). 
 55. FED. R. EVID. 103(e) (Westlaw 2015). 
 56. Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 769 (10th 
Cir. 2004). 
 57. E.g., id. (noting that “[t]here is no ‘plain error’ provision in the rules governing 
civil matters except with respect to erroneous instructions . . . and rulings on evidence,” but  
acknowledging that “[i]n reviewing for plain error [in civil cases], we have used the 
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cases.”58 The Tenth Circuit regularly states that “[t]he plain error 
exception in civil cases . . . is an extraordinary, nearly 
insurmountable burden”59—language that does not appear in 
criminal cases, though the burden in criminal cases is often 
described as “heavy” or “rigorous.”60 Several federal circuits 
expressly recognize a criminal-civil distinction in applying plain 
error.61 Others have gestured in this direction.62
III. PRESERVATION RULES IN UNIQUE CONTEXTS
The principles of waiver, forfeiture, and plain error 
constitute the general rules of preservation, but there are some 
legal contexts in which these rules either don’t apply or have 
unique application. 
 58. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (referring to cases in which 
“the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings”). 
 59. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 802 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added); see also Richison, 634 F.3d at 1130 (“In civil cases [plain error] often 
proves to be an ‘extraordinary, nearly insurmountable burden[.]’” (quoting Employers 
Reinsurance, 358 F.3d at 770)).
 60. See United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1296 (10th Cir. 2013); MacKay, 715 
F.3d at 831 n.17.
 61. See Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[Olano]
was a criminal case but in this circuit, the same requirements are commonly imposed in 
civil cases, and even more stringently.”); C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1016 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plain error standard of review in the civil context is similar to, but 
stricter than, the plain error standard of review applied in criminal cases.”); United States v. 
Levy, 391 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough . . . we may notice plain error in civil 
cases, we have also reasoned that its scope is significantly narrower in that context.” 
(citation omitted)).
 62. See Williams, 399 F.3d at 455 (“[T]he ability of appellate courts to correct 
unpreserved error might be greater in criminal cases . . . .”); Watson v. O’Neill, 365 F.3d 
609, 615 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The plain-error exception ‘must be confined to the most 
compelling cases, especially in civil, as opposed to criminal, litigation.’”  (quoting Johnson 
v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 679 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987))); Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora 
Christian Sch., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 1005 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although forfeited arguments 
typically remain subject to review for plain error in criminal cases, the plain error doctrine 
will rarely permit this court to reach forfeited arguments in civil litigation.”); Fashauer v. 
N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1289 (3d Cir. 1995) (“If anything, the 
plain error power in the civil context—which is judicially rather than statutorily created—
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A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a limitation on the 
adjudicatory power of the federal courts and “an inseparable 
element of the constitutional system of checks and balances.” 63
It cannot be conferred by the parties’ consent and so is not 
subject to principles of waiver and forfeiture. A party may 
challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the 
proceedings—for the first time on appeal, or even for the first 
time in the Supreme Court.64 Indeed, federal courts are required 
to raise the issue sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction 
“does not affirmatively appear in the record.”65
The rule for sovereign immunity is similar: Sovereign 
immunity may be raised for the first time on appeal.66 But unlike 
subject matter jurisdiction, sovereign immunity is waivable, and 
the court may, but need not, consider the issue sua sponte.67
Because jurisdictional issues are not subject to the 
principles of waiver and forfeiture, appellants often seek to 
characterize newly raised arguments—particularly arguments 
based on statutory language—as jurisdictional in nature. The 
Supreme Court “has endeavored in recent years to bring some 
discipline to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’”68 It has 
adopted what it calls a “readily administrable bright line”: Has 
Congress “clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional”?69 If not, 
the restriction is non-jurisdictional and is subject to the rules of 
waiver and forfeiture.70
The Tenth Circuit “has always maintained a distinction 
between its obligation to consider arguments which might 
undermine its subject matter jurisdiction and arguments which 
 63. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting 
Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)). 
 64. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). 
 65. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982).
 66. United States ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff, 548 F.3d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 67. Id.
 68. Gonzalez v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (quoting Henderson 
v. Shinseki, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202–03 (2011)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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might support it.”71 New appellate arguments in support of
jurisdiction or opposing sovereign immunity are treated 
differently than new arguments contesting jurisdiction or 
asserting sovereign immunity. The former are subject to plain-
error review; the latter are not.72
B. Objections to Evidence 
Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires a party to timely 
object or make an offer of proof when the district court 
erroneously admits or excludes evidence.73 Claims of 
evidentiary error, if properly preserved, are reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.74 If a party does not timely object to the admission 
or exclusion of evidence, Rule 103(e) states that “[a] court may 
take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right.”75 This 
is the familiar plain-error standard.76
Often, a party will tee up an evidentiary issue through a 
pretrial motion in limine. If the court rules on the motion, is it 
necessary for a party to renew an objection or offer of proof at 
trial? Rule 103(b) seems to say no: “Once the [district] court 
rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a 
party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a 
claim of error for appeal.”77 Yet the Tenth Circuit has added its 
own gloss to this requirement. It applies a three-part test, called 
the contemporaneous-objection rule, to determine whether a 
party must object at the time of trial (when the evidence is 
actually admitted or excluded) in order to preserve objections 
made in an earlier motion in limine.78 A party need not 
 71. Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1152 (10th Cir. 
2012) (citing Daigle). 
 72.  See id.; Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1539 (“[O]ur responsibility to ensure even sua sponte 
that we have subject matter jurisdiction before considering a case differs from our 
discretion to eschew untimely raised legal theories which may support that jurisdiction. . . . 
We have no duty under the general waiver rule to consider the latter.” (citation omitted)).
 73. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (Westlaw 2015). 
 74. Nat’l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng’g Co., 256 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 75. FED. R. EVID. 103(e) (Westlaw 2015). 
 76. See Prager v. Campbell Cnty. Memorial Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1054 (10th Cir. 
2013).
 77. FED. R. EVID. 103(a), (b) (Westlaw 2015). 
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contemporaneously object if “(1) the matter was adequately 
presented to the district court; (2) the issue was of a type that 
can be finally decided prior to trial; and (3) the court’s ruling 
was definitive.”79
1. Adequately Presented 
The “key inquiry” under the first prong of the test is 
“whether trial counsel substantially satisfied the requirement of 
putting the court on notice as to his concern.”80 It’s best to 
commit the issue to writing through, for example, a motion in 
limine81 or a trial brief.82 If objection must be made orally, the 
court is a bit more generous, recognizing that “in the heat of a 
trial, counsel might not explain the evidentiary basis of his 
argument as thoroughly as might ideally be desired.”83
2. Amenable to Final Pretrial Determination 
To excuse a party from having to contemporaneously 
object, the evidentiary issue must be “of a type that could be 
decided prior to trial.”84 Not every issue will meet this standard, 
as
some evidentiary issues are akin to questions of law, and 
the decision to admit such evidence is not dependent upon 
the character of the other evidence admitted at trial. . . . On 
the other hand, some admission decisions are fact-bound 
 79. Id. (quoting Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 380 (10th Cir. 1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). To implement the contemporaneous objection rule, the 
Tenth Circuit’s local rules require principal briefs to “cite the precise reference in the 
record where a required objection was made and ruled on.” 10TH CIR. R. 28.2(C)(3) 
(2016).
 80. Prager, 731 F.3d at 1054 (citation omitted). 
 81. See National Environmental, 256 F.3d at 1001 (“Here, the issues were adequately 
presented to the district court in NESCO’s initial motion in limine . . . .”).
 82. Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 380 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that 
counsel “argued the question” in trial briefs). 
 83. Prager, 731 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 
174 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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determinations dependent upon the character of the 
evidence introduced at trial.85
Examples of evidentiary issues not amenable to final pretrial 
determination are relevance of a given piece of evidence and 
whether relevant evidence is unduly prejudicial. To properly 
preserve these issues for appeal, a party must interpose a 
contemporaneous objection.86
3. Definitive 
Finally, the district court’s ruling must be “definitive.” 
Sometimes, a district court will make a “conditional” ruling on a 
motion in limine. For example, a party might move pretrial to 
exclude certain evidence as irrelevant. Since relevance is often 
hard to assess in the abstract, a district court may “conditionally 
deny” the motion and reserve a final ruling for trial. In this 
situation, the party must raise a contemporaneous objection 
when the evidence is actually introduced at trial. Failure to do so 
means forfeiture and plain-error review.87
C. Jury Instructions 
Objections to jury instructions in civil cases are governed 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, which requires 
objections to be timely raised in the district court.88 Under the 
Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence, “the objection must proffer the 
same grounds raised on appeal with sufficient clarity to render 
the grounds obvious, plain, or unmistakable.”89 If an objection is 
not properly preserved, Rule 51(d)(2) provides that “[a] court 
 85. United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 987 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
 86. See id. at 985 n.1, 987 n.3; United States v. McGlothin, 705 F.3d 1254, 1260 n.9 
(10th Cir. 2013). 
 87. See McGlothin, 705 F.3d at 1260 & n.9.
 88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(c)(2) (Westlaw 2015).
 89. Therrien, 617 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. Choren, 393 
F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To implement this 
requirement, the Tenth Circuit’s local rules require principal briefs to “cite the precise 
reference in the record where a required objection was made and ruled on.” This is the 
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may consider a plain error in the instructions . . . if the error 
affects substantial rights.”90
In criminal cases, objections to jury instructions must also 
be “timely and specific.”91 Failure to preserve an objection 
results in review for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b).92 Whether civil Rule 51(d)(2) or criminal Rule 
52(b) applies, the four-prong plain-error test is the same.93
D. Preservation in Criminal Cases 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which governs 
unpreserved errors in criminal cases, provides that “[a] plain 
error that affects substantial rights may be considered even 
though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”94 The 
Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in United States v. Olano95
remains the principal precedent construing this rule. Under 
Olano, all forfeited errors in a criminal proceeding are subject to 
Rule 52(b), regardless of how serious the alleged error may be.96
Although the Tenth Circuit has never so held, the Second 
Circuit has persuasively reasoned that plain-error review under 
Rule 52 should have less stringent application to sentencing 
errors than to errors occurring in the conduct of a jury trial.97
The reason is the difference in judicial and social costs. “A 
resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and 
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 51(d)(2) (Westlaw 2015). 
 91. Bader, 678 F.3d at 867.
 92. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1157.
 93. See id.
 94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (Westlaw 2015). 
 95. 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
 96. See id. at 731 (noting that “‘a constitutional right,’ or a right of any other sort, ‘may 
be forfeited in criminal . . . cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right ’” 
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944))); United States v. Reyna, 358 
F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (pointing out that “the [Supreme] Court [in Olano]
suggested that all forfeited errors in a criminal proceeding are subject to Rule 52(b) 
analysis” regardless of “the seriousness of the claimed error”); see also United States v. 
Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he seriousness of claimed errors does not 
operate to remove them from Rule 52(b).”). 
 97. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d at 456–58; see also Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 
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court personnel.”98 A second trial is much more costly in terms 
of “time, resources, and disruption in the lives of participants,” 
and so, to remedy unpreserved error, a court should order a 
second trial only “sparingly.”99
When the issue on appeal concerns a criminal defendant’s 
waiver of a right rather than forfeiture of an error, Rule 52 does 
not apply, and special considerations come into play. Most of a 
criminal defendant’s rights are waivable, but some, like jury 
unanimity, are not.100 Courts must also consider whether the 
waiver requires personal participation by the defendant, whether 
certain procedures are required for waiver, and whether the 
defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or 
voluntary.101
E. Waiving the Waiver, Forfeiting the Forfeiture 
Waiver and forfeiture are substantive arguments that must 
be asserted on appeal if a party wants the court to consider them. 
An appellee’s failure to interpose a forfeiture defense when it 
clearly applies is itself a forfeiture, and the Tenth Circuit is more 
likely in that instance to “overlook” a preservation problem and 
reach the merits of an issue.102 This is known as “forfeiting the 
forfeiture,”103 though the court sometimes (incorrectly) calls it 
“waiving the waiver.”104
If true waiver has occurred, the Tenth Circuit has 
admonished that “a party that has waived a right is not entitled 
to appellate relief.”105 Nonetheless, the court will reach the 
merits of a waived argument in criminal cases when the 
 98. Williams, 399 F.3d at 456. 
 99. Id.
 100. Teague, 443 F.3d at 1316–17.
 101. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733; Teague, 443 F.3d at 1317. 
 102. See United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 873 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012); see also 
Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 618 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2010); Niemi v. Lasshofer, 
728 F.3d 1252, 126–62 (10th Cir. 2013) (refusing to entertain forfeiture argument where 
appellee failed to assert forfeiture in its answer brief and raised it for the first time in a Rule 
28(j) letter following oral argument).
 103. See Cook, 618 F.3d at 1139 (“Plaintiffs have themselves forfeited any forfeiture 
argument they may have on this issue, and this court will consider the merits of 
Defendants’ argument.”); Abernathy v. Wandes, 713 F.3d 538, 552 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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government fails to invoke the waiver on appeal.106 Whether the 
court would follow a similar path in civil cases is not clear. We 
have uncovered no civil case in the Tenth Circuit in which an 
appellee’s failure to invoke waiver on appeal led the court to 
take up an argument that the appellant had waived in the district 
court.107
IV. APPELLATE BRIEFING AND ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellate briefs and oral argument are the primary vehicles 
for presenting arguments to the federal courts of appeals, and 
they come with their own set of preservation rules. 
A. Briefs and Oral Argument 
1. Opening Brief 
The appellant’s opening brief to the court of appeals is all-
important. It is “the most highly structured of all the briefs,”108
and it must contain, among other things, “appellant’s 
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the 
authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant 
relies.”109 An argument or issue not raised in an opening brief is 
“deemed waived,”110 and the court “will not address it on the 
merits.”111
 106. See United States v. Contreras-Ramos, 457 F.3d 1144, 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he waiver is waived when the government utterly neglects to invoke the waiver in this 
court.” (quoting United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 930-31 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 103 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 107. But the Tenth Circuit seems at least to have recognized the possibility. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 837 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“Sometimes it may even be improper not to consider an issue waived by the parties.”); 
Richison, 634 F.3d at 1127 (“If the theory was intentionally relinquished or abandoned in 
the district court, we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider it.”) (emphasis added).
 108. 16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3974.1, 230 (4th ed. 2008). 
 109. Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting FED. R. APP.
P. 28(a)(9)(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Murphy v. Sloan, 764 F.3d 1144, 1152 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the issue 
was raised neither in the opening brief on appeal nor in the trial court); Becker v. Kroll, 
494 F.3d 904, 913 n.6 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 111. Bowdry v. United Airlines, Inc., 58 F.3d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1995). Technically, 
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The same is true if an argument is “inadequately presented” 
in an opening brief.112 “[W]e expect attorneys appearing before 
this court to state the issues on appeal expressly and clearly, 
with theories adequately identified and supported with proper 
argument,” the Tenth Circuit has said.113 Thus, “[s]cattered 
statements,”114 “bald assertions,”115 and issues briefed “in a 
perfunctory manner,” without citations to authority or the record 
and without developed argumentation,116 are not enough to 
preserve an issue for appeal. As the Sixth Circuit has put it, “[i]t 
is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the 
most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its 
bones.”117
2. Reply Brief 
Generally, the court will not consider an argument raised 
for the first time in a reply brief.118 This would be unfair to both 
the appellee, who has no opportunity for a written response, and 
the court itself, which would “run the risk of an improvident or 
ill-advised opinion, given [its] dependence . . . on the adversarial 
process for sharpening the issues for decision.”119 Nonetheless, 
the Tenth Circuit “make[s] an exception when the new issue 
argued in the reply brief is offered in response to an argument 
raised in the appellee’s brief,”120 especially if the appellee has 
posited an alternative ground for affirmance.121 And, of course, 
Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. But it’s a forfeiture that, like waiver, results in the court’s 
refusal to consider the issue; hence the term “deemed waiver.” 
 112. Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104.
 113. Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 114. Exum v. United States Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1133 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 115. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 116. Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 915 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 117. Hayward, 759 F.3d at 618 n.9 (alteration in original) (quoting McPherson v. 
Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 118. See United States v. Bass, 661 F.3d 1299, 1301 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011). Such 
arguments are also “deemed waived.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1166 n.8 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Harrell, 642 F.3d 907, 918 (10th Cir. 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d 1236, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Headrick v. Rockwell 
Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 1994) (White, J.)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 120. Beaudry v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164, 1166 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003). 
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if the argument pertains to (a lack of) subject-matter jurisdiction, 
the court is obliged to consider it.122
It bears re-emphasis that, like most preservation rules, the 
rule against new arguments in reply is discretionary. Whether 
the court will consider such an argument depends on the 
complexity of the question,123 the adequacy of the factual 
record, whether the parties addressed the issue in the district 
court,124 and (perhaps) a need to avoid manifest injustice.125
3. Oral Argument 
Oral argument is an important part of the appellate process. 
“It contributes to judicial accountability, it guards against undue 
reliance upon staff work, and it promotes understanding in ways 
that cannot be matched by written communication.”126 It also 
“assures the litigant that his case has been given consideration 
by those charged with deciding it.”127 But oral argument is no 
place to “supplement” the record or the briefs.128 Indeed, Tenth 
Circuit “precedent holds that issues may not be raised for the 
first time at oral argument.”129
 122. See Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994) (indicating that the court 
“generally” will not  “consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief . . . except 
when those issues relate to jurisdictional requirements”). 
 123. United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 554 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990).
 124. See Coit v. Zavaras, 280 F. App’x 791, 793 (10th Cir. 2008) (indicating that both 
parties addressed the issue in the district court). 
 125.  See Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1173 n.12 (10th Cir. 2012) (exercising 
discretion to consider and reject new argument raised in reply brief filed in capital case, 
and noting that new argument would not warrant court’s reaching a different result). 
 126. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 108, at § 3980 (quoting Commission on Revision of the 
Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for 
Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 254–255 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 127. Id.
 128.  See Nero v. Rice, 986 F.2d 1428, at *2 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table 
decision).
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B. The Rule of Richison: Appellant’s Affirmative Duty 
to Raise Plain Error 
Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc.,130 addressed an appellant 
who raised a new argument on appeal but failed to explain how 
it satisfied plain-error review. Refusing to consider the 
argument, the court held that “the failure to argue for plain error 
and its application on appeal . . . marks the end of the road for an 
argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”131
Under Richison, the appellant has an affirmative duty to explain 
how a newly raised argument satisfies each prong of the plain-
error test. The court will not, on its own, craft a plain-error 
argument for the appellant.132
After Richison, it is not clear how an appellant fulfills her 
duty to raise plain error. Must she argue for plain-error review in 
her opening brief? Or is it sufficient to make the argument in a 
reply brief, or even at oral argument? So far, the Tenth Circuit 
has punted on these questions.133
In our view, the appellant should not be required to 
articulate a plain-error argument in her opening brief. She 
should be permitted to raise it in a reply brief, and then only if 
it’s necessary. Recall that forfeiture is akin to an affirmative 
defense, and if an appellee doesn’t raise the forfeiture, the court 
is free to proceed to the merits of the issue.134 A rule requiring 
the appellant to argue for plain error in her opening brief would 
put the cart before the horse, requiring the appellant to raise her 
own forfeiture at the outset. Plus, there are many reasons why 
the appellee may want to forego a forfeiture argument on appeal. 
Perhaps the appellee also wants the court to rule on the merits of 
the issue. Perhaps it’s not clear whether a forfeiture occurred, 
and the appellee prefers not to sidetrack the court into a tedious 
review of the record and arguments below. In any event, 
forfeiture is the appellee’s prerogative to raise. If the appellee 
 130. 634 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 131. Id. at 1131. 
 132. See id.; MacKay, 715 F.3d at 813 n.17 (“[A]n appellant carries the heavy burden of 
satisfying plain error. And if an appellant fails to satisfy that burden, we do not develop a 
plain error argument for the appellant.” (citation omitted)).
 133. MacKay, 715 F.3d at 831, 831 n.17.
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fails to raise forfeiture in her answer brief, the appellant need not 
address it. If, on the other hand, the appellee does raise it, the 
appellant should be permitted in her reply brief to address the 
forfeiture and articulate a plain-error argument.135
Whether an appellant may invoke plain error for the first 
time at oral argument is not clear. The Tenth Circuit has, on at 
least one occasion, addressed a plain-error argument raised for 
the first time at oral argument, though it ultimately found no 
plain error.136
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We began this article by noting the limited power of Article 
III courts to decide the issues the parties present for their review. 
The Tenth Circuit frequently reiterates that it depends heavily on 
the adversarial process to fully air the parties’ positions, sharpen 
the issues for review, and avoid ill-informed decisions.137 As the 
court recently put it, “[i]n our adversarial system we don’t 
usually go looking for trouble but rely instead on the parties to 
identify the issues we must decide.”138
Still, judicial decisionmaking isn’t like baseball 
arbitration—it’s not a binary either-or exercise.139 A federal 
court of appeals isn’t limited to sifting the parties’ positions and 
selecting the position it likes best, nor is it bound by the parties’ 
framing of a particular issue. “[W]hen an issue or claim is 
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the 
 135. See McKay, 715 F.3d at 831 n.17 (“[W]e do not discount the possibility that we 
may consider a plain error argument made for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief.”); 
Beaudry, 331 F.3d at 1166 n.3 (recognizing that new issue may be raised in reply brief if it 
is “offered in response to an argument raised in the appellee’s brief”); cf. Somerlott., 686 
F.3d at 1151 (providing appellant opportunity to present plain-error argument in 
supplemental briefing, but concluding that she failed to do so).
 136. Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, 497 F.3d at 1142–43.
 137. See Hill, 478 F.3d at 1251.
 138. Niemi, 728 F.3d at 1259.
 139. Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major 
League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer 
Disputes, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 110 (2009) (explaining “baseball arbitration” by 
noting that “[t]his type of dispute resolution forces an arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, to 
pick either one party’s offer or the other’s”); see also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Canon-
McMillan Sch. Dist., 152 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (“What may be appropriate for 
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particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather 
retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper 
construction of governing law.”140 So, for example, even if the 
parties agree that a contract is unambiguous (but differ on its 
meaning), the court is free to decide otherwise.141 Or, where one 
party says a statute, contract, or case means “A” and the other 
says it means “B,” the court may decide that it means “C.”142
The court is more likely to address an issue not identified or 
briefed by parties if the issue is “antecedent to and ultimately 
dispositive of the dispute.”143
The court’s inherent power to consider unraised issues only 
underscores the discretionary nature of appellate preservation 
rules. The rules are not mechanistic formulas. Rather, they 
“confer[] a discretion that may be exercised at any time, no 
matter what may have been done at some other time.”144 The 
facts of individual cases matter.145 Even stare decisis does not 
fully control a court’s power to consider unpreserved arguments 
on appeal.146
Because preservation rules live in the realm of judicial 
discretion, counsel do well to remember the reasons behind the 
rules. As we have seen, the rules vindicate structural values, like 
respect for the division of labor between trial and appellate 
 140. Moser, 747 F.3d at 837 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank v. 
Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
 141. See id.
 142. See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nanodetex Corp., 733 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 
2013) (indicating that the court disagreed with both parties); Fricke v. Sec’y of Navy, 509 
F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2007) (indicating that “both parties’ arguments are based on an 
incorrect reading of our case”); see also In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“[T]he parties offer quite different interpretations of the statute. . . . [W]e conclude 
that neither party is entirely correct.”). 
 143. Moser, 747 F.3d at 837 (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 447) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
 144. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910); Abernathy, 713 F.3d at 552 
(“[T]he decision regarding what issues are appropriate to entertain on appeal in instances of 
lack of preservation is discretionary.”). 
 145. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121 (recognizing that whether to take up an issue not raised 
at trial is a matter of discretion “to be exercised on the facts of individual cases”).
 146. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362 (“[T]he [plain-error] rule is not altogether controlled by 
precedent.”); United States v. Vanover, 630 F.3d 1108, 1123 n.10 (8th Cir. 2011) (Riley, J., 
concurring) (“[T]hat stare decisis applies in the plain-error context seems doubtful in light 
of Weems.”). Still, the Tenth Circuit will consider how it has resolved similar cases in the 
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courts, and prudential values, like allowing the court to avoid 
difficult or unresolved questions of law. Of course, 
considerations of fairness are paramount. On the one hand, 
preservation rules help avoid prejudice and unfair surprise to the 
parties. On the other hand, appellate courts must retain the 
power to correct plain errors that implicate a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice, even if the error was not noticed below. 
Every case involving forfeiture, waiver, or some other 
aspect of preservation is an attempt to strike a sensible balance 
among these competing considerations. Although the legal 
formulas (like the four-part plain-error test) matter, perhaps 
more important is the court’s own sense of how these various 
considerations align with the facts and posture of a particular 
case. Prudent counsel, in her briefing and oral argument, will 
assist the court in striking the right judicial balance. 
